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Abstract
This article analyzes Keynes’s “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchil-
dren”—an essay presenting Keynes’s views about economic growth into the 
21st century—from the perspective of modern growth theory. I ﬁ  nd that the 
implicit theoretical framework used by Keynes to form his expectations about 
the 21st-century world economy is remarkably close to modern growth models, 
featuring a stable steady-state growth path driven by technological progress. 
On the other hand, Keynes’s forecast of employment in the 21st century is far 
off the mark, reﬂ  ecting a mistaken view that the income elasticity of leisure is 
much higher than that of consumption.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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In the early stages of the Great Depression, John May-
nard Keynes took time out from his role as a policy 
adviser, research economist, and economic journalist to 
write “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren,” an 
essay presenting his forecasts for the world economy of the 
21st century. Published in 1930, “Economic Possibilities” 
reveals a fascinating and very different portrait of Keynes. 
The essay shows that Keynes had an understanding of mod-
ern economic growth that was at least 25 years ahead of his 
time. His views about long-run growth are very similar to 
today’s frontier growth theory, more so than his much bet-
ter known and much more inﬂuential views about business 
cycles. Keynes’s qualitative and quantitative predictions 
of the continuing success of the leading economies were 
remarkably accurate. After making these extraordinarily 
accurate 100-year predictions, Keynes freely moves away 
from economics to try on the much broader hat of a wide-
ranging social scientist and social critic. But here, Keynes’s 
assessments are wide off the mark, reﬂecting his idiosyn-
cratic views about human nature and the counterfactual 
view that the income elasticity of leisure was much higher 
than that of consumption in the long run. 
Keynes on Growth: Way Ahead of His Time
The modern theory of economic growth—Solow (1956), 
Swan (1956), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), Lucas 
(1988), and Romer (1990)—provides the foundation for 
long-run (steady-state) growth driven by technological 
change and capital accumulation, and provides the stan-
dard competitive decentralization for growth economies. 
Given a constant rate of technological progress, a plau-
sibly restricted one-sector growth model can establish a 
unique long-run growth path with monotonic convergence 
to that path for any value of the capital stock. The break-
through development of modern growth theory, combined 
with over 200 years of roughly average per capita growth, 
provides modern economists with an advanced under-
standing of long-run economic behavior and the ability 
to make reasonably accurate predictions. For example, 
Leamer (2004) shows that real GDP over nearly the last 40 
years has never been more than 3 percent above or below 
its long-run trend of about 3 percent growth. But would 
any economist today, even with the beneﬁt of training 
in frontier growth theory, try to make serious economic 
projections 100 years out? Very unlikely, but Keynes 
did, and did so remarkably well—in all honesty, much 
too well—given the available theory and the existing 
economic conditions when he was writing. 
  *Reprinted from Revisiting Keynes: Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchil-
dren, edited by Lorenzo Pecchi and Gustavo Piga, to be published by the MIT Press 
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Keynes, as well as other leading economists of the 
early 20th century, did not have sufﬁcient theory nor a 
sufﬁcient empirical record to gauge long-run economic 
behavior the way modern economists can. Growth 
theory—as we know it today—did not exist in the 1930s. 
There was little in the way of theory that would lead 
an economist of that era to conﬁdently predict a stable 
steady-state growth path in which output remains close 
to its long-run trend. The Harrod-Domar model that was 
developed in the 1930s predicted that market economies 
were unstable, with chronically high unemployment, and 
that steady states were knife-edge propositions. 
There was also little to guide an economist to con-
ﬁdently predict long-run changes from an empirical 
perspective. At the time “Economic Possibilities” was 
written, the United Kingdom was entering its second 
decade of severe depression. Real GDP per person in 
1930 relative to a 1.4 percent average trend was more 
than 20 percent below its 1913 level, and had been close 
to 20 percent below trend during the entire previous de-
cade. Moreover, hours worked were 27 percent below its 
historical average throughout the 1920s and 1930s (see 
Cole and Ohanian 2002). Keynes somehow remained 
optimistic after more than a decade of abysmal economic 
performance in his own country, and with the start of the 
Great Depression around the rest of the world: 
It is common to hear people say that the epoch of enormous 
economic progress . . . is over; that the rapid improvement 
in the standard of life is now going to slow down. . . . I 
believe that this is a wildly mistaken interpretation of what 
is happening. . . . [T]he economic problem may be solved 
. . . within a hundred years. . . . [T]he standard of life in 
progressive countries one hundred years hence will be 
between four and eight times as high as it is to-day. 
The “economic problem,” as Keynes called it, has 
certainly been solved for the majority of households 
in the “progressive countries” over the last 75 years, 
as Keynes’s forecast that per capita income would 
advance by a factor of four to eight between 1930 and 
2030 (which is an eerily accurate average growth rate of 
between 1.4 to 2.1 percent per capita across the indus-
trialized countries) has indeed been realized. Moreover, 
rapid growth over the last 50 years has made many East 
Asian countries rich, and by 2030, which is the end of 
Keynes’s 100-year horizon, there is enormous potential 
for much of the world’s remaining population to achieve 
a reasonable degree of economic success. China and 
India, which together account for close to 40 percent 
of the world’s population, have clearly entered the era 
of modern economic growth, and may double their per 
capita income levels by 2030. 
Perhaps the only regions during the lifetimes of 
Keynes’s “grandchildren” to remain in poverty will be 
Africa and the Middle East, and certainly no one in 1930 
could have foreseen the enormous development impedi-
ments that these two regions face. Keynes’s long-run 
forecasts were remarkable well beyond any reasonable 
expectation for success in this venture. 
What factors led Keynes to make such “startling” and 
accurate projections? Perhaps the most important reason 
is that Keynes had all the makings of a superb growth 
theorist. “Economic Possibilities” reveals that Keynes 
had a sophisticated understanding of the key ingredients 
that would form the foundations of the modern theory 
of economic growth, which would not be written for 
30 years: technological advances, capital accumula-
tion, low population growth. Keynes combined these 
ingredients with a strong expectation of the robustness 
of the steady-state growth path, rather than the knife-
edge nature of the growth path of the Harrod-Domar 
model that dominated growth until Solow’s 1956 paper. 
Keynes’s discussion of the transformation of the leading 
economies from the Malthusian era—in which there 
was virtually no per capita income growth—to the era 
of sustained economic growth could appear in a modern 
growth text or journal article: 
From the sixteenth century, with a cumulative crescendo 
after the eighteenth, the great age of science and technical 
inventions began. . . . What is the result? In spite of an 
enormous growth in the population of the world . . . the 
average standard of life in Europe and the United States 
has been raised, I think, about fourfold. . . . [I]n our own 
lifetimes . . . we may be able to perform all the operations 
of agriculture, mining, and manufacture with a quarter of 
the human effort to which we have been accustomed. 
Keynes’s views on long-run growth, featuring the role 
of labor-saving technological change and capital accu-
mulation, are squarely in line with modern neoclassical 
growth theory. His insights into the process of growth 
are truly striking. 
But there is a bit—or more than a bit—of luck con-
tributing to Keynes’s successful predictions, as he per-
ceived the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s as purely 
transitory episodes that were related to post–World War I 
adjustments. In contrast, recent studies of depressions—
including the U.K. depression that began in 1921 and FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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that would continue until after World War II—show 
that these long-run episodes were the consequence of 
poorly designed government policies that substantially 
reduced steady-state hours and/or productivity. From 
this perspective, the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s 
should have led Keynes to have important reservations 
about the future long-run performance of the industrial 
economies. Keynes, however, dismissed the impact of 
these policies, and clearly considered the U.K. depres-
sion and the Great Depression as a transitory phenom-
enon that was unrelated to labor policies: 
We are suffering . . . from the growing-pains of over-rapid 
changes, from the painfulness of readjustment between 
one economic period and another. . . . [T]he banking and 
monetary system of the world has been preventing the rate 
of interest from falling as fast as equilibrium requires. 
Of course, Keynes did not have the beneﬁt of mod-
ern theory to guide his assessment. But other leading 
economists of the early 20th century clearly understood 
the contractionary implications of the policies adopted 
at that time. Pigou (1927) described how the United 
Kingdom’s protracted depression was signiﬁcantly af-
fected by government policies: 
[P]artly through direct State action, and partly through 
the added strength given to workpeople’s organisations 
engaged in wage bargaining by the development of un-
employment insurance, wage-rates have, over a wide area, 
been set at a level which is too high . . . and that the very 
large percentage of unemployment which has prevailed 
during the whole of the last six years is due in considerable 
measure to this new factor. 
More generally, Keynes held the view that govern-
ment policies that signiﬁcantly changed the incentives 
to work and save did not have any signiﬁcant negative 
effects. In the 1940s he argued that the United Kingdom 
should signiﬁcantly increase the taxation of capital 
income and adopt a capital levy, and his views consid-
erably inﬂuenced U.K. tax policies through the 1970s. 
During the early stages of World War II, Sir John Hicks 
debated Keynes about the effect of high capital income 
tax rates. Hicks argued that high tax rates would reduce 
the rate of capital accumulation and growth, to which 
Keynes replied, “My Dear Hicks, I scarcely imagine 
that individuals are as actuarially-minded as you pre-
sume they are.” The view that capital accumulation was 
insensitive to taxes led Keynes to conclude that capital 
income should be taxed at nearly 100 percent during the 
war, and that a permanent capital levy should be adopted 
following the war (see Cooley and Ohanian 1997). 
Keynes’s failure to understand the distorting effects 
of government policies, and his view that economic 
depressions were temporary bumps on the road, were 
central for his very optimistic and very accurate forecast 
of continuing long-run economic growth. Keynes was 
unbelievably accurate, but some of this accuracy is 
for the wrong reasons. The advanced economies were 
ultimately able to grow because the worst government 
policies of the 1920s and 1930s were reformed or elimi-
nated. The U.K. unemployment beneﬁts system, which 
initially provided very high beneﬁt levels indeﬁnitely 
for employment tenure of as little as one day, was re-
formed considerably, and the capital tax rate of nearly 
100 percent that was adopted in the 1940s declined to 
a level comparable to that in the United States by the 
early 1980s. And in the United States, labor policies 
such as the National Industrial Recovery Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act were either unwound by 
President Roosevelt during World War II or declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. If these policies 
had remained in place, the United Kingdom and the 
United States might be much poorer today than Keynes 
had predicted. 
The “Perils” of Leisure: 
The Decline of the West?
According to Keynes, the problem of producing suf-
ﬁcient output was not the central difﬁculty facing the 
industrial economies. Rather, it would be dealing with 
the “problem” of the enormous amount of leisure that 
would be consumed as societies became sufﬁciently rich 
and sated with physical consumption. Keynes’s view 
was likely inﬂuenced by the fact that hours worked per 
adult in the advanced countries were falling during the 
preceding 50 years. Thus, the central issue for Keynes 
was creating “solutions” for “the idle hands” of the 
population as economies grew increasingly wealthy. 
Keynes forecasts that hours worked might be around 
15 hours per week, which would reﬂect roughly a two-
thirds decline from the existing workweek length in 
1929. 
Keynes does not provide any details on how he ar-
rived at this forecast, and this raises the question of what 
economic theory or quantitative procedures he used to 
arrive at this number. The decline is much larger than a 
forecast produced from simply extrapolating the histori-
cal decline in hours worked. In particular, hours worked Back to the Future with Keynes
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per capita declined about 10 percent in the United States 
between 1889 and 1929, and this same rate of decline 
between 1929 and 2029 generates a further 23 percent 
decline, far short of the two-thirds decline predicted by 
Keynes. 
To try to shed light on this forecast and to speciﬁcally 
see if Keynes was making a forecast consistent with 
modern growth theory, I construct a model economy and 
simulate it in response to technological change over the 
century Keynes considered. The model is presented in 
the Appendix, and here I brieﬂy summarize it. There is 
a production side of the model, featuring a standard con-
stant returns-to-scale production function that combines 
labor and capital to produce a single good that is divided 
between consumption and investment. The production 
side of the model, featuring labor-augmenting techno-
logical progress and capital accumulation, is entirely 
consistent with Keynes’s discussion. As is standard, the 
capital stock depreciates at a constant rate over time. 
There is a constant rate of technological progress that 
leads to increasing wealth over time. Regarding the 
household side of the model, there is a representative 
household that values consumption of output and leisure. 
I make use of the observed decline in hours worked 
preceding 1929 to quantitatively choose the prefer-
ence parameters of the model that govern the income 
elasticities of consumption and leisure. This will tailor 
the model so that it captures Keynes’s expectations that 
leisure rises as society becomes increasingly wealthy. I 
will then use the model to deduce the change in hours 
that would occur in this model economy over the century 
that Keynes considered. 
The solution to the model is characterized by solving 
a set of nonlinear equations for the endogenous variables 
in the model—consumption, hours worked, leisure, out-
put, and investment—at each date from 1930 until 2030. 
The model is solved numerically, since a closed-form 
solution does not exist for this model. 
The model generates the observed decline in hours 
per adult population between 1889 and 1929, and it 
generates a 40 percent decline in hours worked between 
1929 and 2006, and a 54 percent decline between 1929 
and 2029, compared to Keynes’s prediction of a 67 per-
cent decline. Thus, Keynes’s forecast was fairly close 
to that predicted by a modern growth model calibrated 
using the methods developed by real business cycle 
theorists Kydland and Prescott! 
Of course, technological change increases welfare by 
generating higher leisure and higher consumption in this 
model. But Keynes held a very different view regarding 
the value of leisure that he based on his observations of 
how wealthy women spent their time, and his subjective 
view of the value of those activities: 
[W]ives of the well-to-do classes, unfortunate women . . . 
who have been deprived by their wealth of their traditional 
tasks . . . are quite unable to ﬁnd anything more amusing. 
Keynes extrapolated these opinions more generally, and 
clariﬁed his view that leisure was indeed a negative con-
sequence of economic growth: “Yet there is no country 
and no people, I think, who can look forward to the age 
of leisure and of abundance without a dread.” 
Keynes takes on the role of a social critic at this junc-
ture. And as a social critic, Keynes stumbles a bit, using 
neither observation nor theory to guide his reasoning or 
his conclusions. Keynes presents no evidence or analysis 
to convince us that wealthy women in 1920s England 
were indeed “unfortunate,” nor does he convince us that 
their leisure time is unproductive. And his presumption 
that leisure would continue to rise signiﬁcantly over 
time as the world became increasingly wealthy did not 
occur. Hours worked in the United States and the United 
Kingdom are in fact higher now than they were 30 years 
ago, and there seems to be little concern among social 
scientists studying time allocation that leisure time is not 
highly valued among households (see Schor 1992). 
It is unfair to compare Keynes’s social criticism 
presented in a brief essay to the more detailed analyses 
of social issues written by others around this time, but 
it is nevertheless signiﬁcant that the works of others 
who addressed similar issues using a blend of econom-
ics, sociology, and anthropology are more carefully 
constructed and informed by observation, and have had 
more impact. For example, Thorstein Veblen (1899) ar-
gued that “status” drove economic activity, and provided 
support for this argument through socioeconomic data 
taken from many different cultures over time. Veblen’s 
work has had a long-lasting impact on social science, and 
even on neoclassical economics (see Cole, Mailath, and 
Postlewaite 1992). In particular, Veblen’s observations 
and analysis have been regarded as sufﬁciently interest-
ing as to challenge the neoclassical approach of purely 
market-based exchange of goods and services. 
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite were the ﬁrst to for-
mally incorporate the challenging concepts of “status” 
and “mores” into neoclassical models and thus study the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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allocation of nonmarket goods in this environment. They 
interpreted an individual’s status as a ranking device 
that determines their success in the nonmarket sector, 
and they showed that the existence of a nonmarket sec-
tor can endogenously generate a demand in society for 
relative position. Keynes’s best work combined theory 
and observation in interesting ways, but his discussion of 
the leisure class did not adequately use either theoretical 
tools or empirical tools, and his analysis and predictions 
of this phenomenon were wide off the mark. 
Conclusion 
“Economic Possibilities” presents a rare view of 
Keynes. As Keynes sensibly and clearly describes the 
foundations and implications of the Solow and Swan 
models 25 years in advance of their development, his 
essay provides a glimpse of a gifted economist with 
enormous potential as a growth theorist. It is indeed 
intriguing to imagine how the history of growth 
theory—and economics—could have changed had 
Keynes pursued growth in greater detail. It is likely that 
neoclassical growth theory—and perhaps the methods 
developed by Kydland and Prescott—would have ar-
rived much sooner. 
The essay also reveals Keynes to be a judgmental 
and critical social commentator who uses his econo-
mist’s pulpit to make a rather puritan-based vision of 
the future in which he feared that wealth would lead to 
lives of unproductive leisure and unhappiness. Despite 
the economic growth that Keynes had predicted, hours 
worked in advanced countries, such as the United States, 
remain much higher than he would have predicted. 
Moreover, declining hours worked in the last 40 years 
in the European countries are not due to rising wealth, 
but rather can be accounted for by higher taxation and 
various labor market restrictions and beneﬁts programs 
(see Ljungqvist and Sargent 1998; Prescott 2004; Oha-
nian, Raffo, and Rogerson 2006). 
Ironically, Keynes argued that policies that change 
the incentives to work, consume, and invest would not 
lead individuals to signiﬁcantly substitute to nonmarket 
activities. And since we have not come close to achiev-
ing the leisure-ﬁlled lives Keynes predicted for the 21st 
century, the question of how high leisure levels would 
affect our lives remains unanswered. I do hope that we 
become sufﬁciently rich to achieve a society in which 
individuals choose to consume more leisure, but not 
because of government policies that reduce the incen-




The economic model that captures Keynes’s views about 
growth and leisure is given by the following constrained 
maximization problem, in which a representative household 
maximizes the discounted sum of lifetime utility: 
   max . E t
tt
t





The maximization problem must obey the set of constraints 
   F k xh c i t tt t t ,, () =+
   ik k tt t = −− () +1 1 G ,
   xx tt + =+ () 1 1 J ,
where E  is the rate at which households discount future utility, 
c is consumption, h is hours worked, x is long-run technologi-
cal change, J is the growth rate of technology, i is investment, 
k is capital, F is a constant returns-to-scale technology (which 
I will assume is Cobb-Douglas with capital share T), and G 
is the depreciation rate. 
This model is typically parameterized with balanced-
growth preferences, so that hours worked is constant along the 
steady-state growth path. The balanced-growth speciﬁcation 
requires a unit substitution elasticity between consumption and 
leisure. For the case of separable utility between consumption 
and leisure, this requires that preferences are logarithmic in 
consumption and that vh () is a convex function. However,
Keynes’s view was not balanced growth but rather declining 
hours worked as wealth increased.
To capture Keynes’s view, I assume the following prefer-
ences: 
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This speciﬁcation generates higher leisure over time as tech-
nology grows and consumption approaches the bliss point, c. 
The key parameters in the model that govern the change in 
hours worked over time are the bliss point value, the curva-
ture parameter \, the scale parameter K, and the growth rate 
of technological progress, J.  Keynes implicitly predicted a 
long-run growth rate of technology ranging between 1.4 and 
2.1 percent per year, so I will choose a value of  J  of 1.75 
percent per year that is the middle of this range. The parameter 
\  governs the labor supply elasticity. I assume that the Frisch 
elasticity is two, which is consistent with the value of this 
parameter used in other applications of this model. I choose 
values for the bliss point () c  and K  so that given the rate of 
technological change, the model generates the observed level 
of hours worked in the United States in 1889 and in 1929. I 
choose the year 1889 as the starting date, as it is the earliest 
year for which Kendrick (1961) constructs aggregate hours 
worked in the United States. The remaining parameters are E, 
the discount factor, and G,the depreciation rate. These are set 
to standard values of 0.96 and 0.06, respectively. 
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